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edited by

Frederick E. Crowe and

Robert M. Doran

Published by University of Toronto Press for

Lonergan Research Institute of Regis College, Toronto

Page 181

165 Christ as Subject: A Reply

of his own intelligent, rational, free, or responsible acts, then by con-
sciousness as knowledge of an object John merely knows himself as
neither consciously intelligent, nor consciously rational, nor consciously
free, nor consciously responsible.'1

My difficulty, then, with the simple, clear, and evident view, which I
named conscientia-perceptio, is that it is simpliste. It takes account of the
fact that by consciousness the subject is known by the subject. It overlooks
the fact that consciousness is not merely cognitive but also constitutive.
It overlooks as well the subtler fact that consciousness is cognitive, not
of what exists without consciousness, but of what is constituted by con-
sciousness. For consciousness does not reveal a prime substance; it reveals
a psychological subject that subsequently may be subsumed, and sub-
sumed correctly, under the category of prime substance. Similarly, con-
sciousness does not reveal the psychological unity that is known in the
field of objects; it constitutes and reveals the basic psychological unity
of the subject as subject. In like manner, consciousness not merely reveals
us as suffering but also makes us capable of suffering; and similarly it
pertains to the constitution of the consciously intelligent subject of in-
telligent acts, the consciously rational subject of rational acts, the con-
sciously free subject of free acts, and the consciously responsible subject
of responsible acts.

How, then, can one account for this constitutive function of conscious-
ness? One cannot reject the principle that knowing simply reveals its
object; one cannot suppose that knowing exercises a constitutive effect
upon its object. It is true that the mode of the knowing may and does
differ from the mode of the reality known. But it is fantastic to suggest
that knowing an object changes the mode of reality in the object.

The alternative, I suggest, is to deny that consciousness is a matter of
knowing an object; the alternative is to deny that only objects are known;
the alternative is to reject the tacit assumption that unumquodque cognos-
citur secundem quod est obiectum, and to put in its place the familiar axiom
that unumquodque cognoscitur secundum quod est actu. On the basis of this
axiom, one can assert that whenever there is a sensibile actu or an intel-
ligibile actu, an object is known; and whenever there is a sensus actu or
an intellectus actu, the subject and his act are known. On this view the
subject in act and his act are constituted and, as well, they are known
simultaneously and concomitantly with the knowledge of objects; for the
sensibile actu is the sensus actu, and the intelligibile actu is the intellectus actu.
Again, on this view the object is known as id quod intenditur, the subject

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan

Page 182

166 Collection

is known as is qui intendit, and the act is known both as the intendere of
the subject and the intendi that regards the object.'4

On this position, which for other reasons I named conscientia-experien-
tia, the constitutive as well as the cognitive aspects of consciousness are
satisfied. For cognitive acts certainly constitute a prime substance as
actually knowing sensible and intelligible objects; on the view I favor,
they also constitute the prime substance as consciously sentient, con-
sciously intelligent, consciously the one principle of many acts, con-
sciously rational when one act supplies the known reason that motivates
another act, consciously free when one act is the principle of other
alternative acts, consciously responsible when the consciously free subject
knows by other acts the consequences of his free choices.15

Such, then, is one difference between conscientia-perceptio and conscien-
tia-experientia. It remains that we listen to Fr Perego's objections.

First, ' ... above all one fails to understand what consciousness con-
ceived as experience is, this consciousness which grounds a confused

14 Consciousness, accordingly, is not to be confused with reflexive activity.
The ordinary operations of intellect are attending, inquiring, under-
standing, conceiving, doubting, weighing the evidence, judging. Their
objects may be either the self or other things. In the former case they
are named reflexive; in the latter, direct. This difference is not formal
but material; in both cases the formal objects are ens, quidditas, verum.
Now by both direct and reflexive operations the subject in act is consti-
tuted and known, not as object, but as subject; this constitutive knowing
and being known is consciousness. Hence, in direct activity the subject
is known once, and as subject; but in reflexive activity the subject is
known twice, as subject by consciousness, and as object by the reflexive
activity. Finally, there is a functional relation between consciousness
and reflexive activity: just as the data for direct activity are supplied by
sense, so the data for reflexive activity are supplied by consciousness.
Hence, just as I think of 'this' by a backward reference to sense,1 so I
think of T by a backward reference to the conscious subject; in both
cases one is thinking of the particular; and we think of particulars, not
because we understand particularity, but because our inquiry and un-
derstanding suppose and regard data. Similarly, just as our judgments
about material things involve a verification of concepts in the data of
sense, so our judgments about our feelings, our minds, our wills involve
a verification of concepts in the data of consciousness. It was this paral-
lelism in function that led me to speak of conscientia-experientia.

15 This is summary. Basic notions are developed leisurely in Insight
320—28, 611, 613. See the notion of emanatio mtelligibilis in Divinarum
personarum conceptio analogica 57—61 [revised in De Deo trino, Vol. 2,
70—74], and subsequently passim. Contemporary discussions of the sub-
ject's consciousness of freedom, notably when enduring torture on
moral grounds, are celebrated.

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348 Index

(see also Solidarity); multiplicity
of data, 95, 102, 128—29 (see also
Intelligible); theological
understanding, 124. Psychological
u. and consciousness, 164—66

Universal and concrete, 176
Universalization of definition, 95
Universe, a dynamic whole, 22; a

hierarchic series of horizontal
strata, 20, 22. U. of being as con-
crete, 148—49; knowing u. of b.,
147; real world as u. of b., 148—49;
world mediated by meaning and
u. of b., 225. U. ultimate goal of
questioning, 211. U. and vertical
finality, 22

University, 110—13. Catholic u., 108,
111-13; ambiguity of, 111-12;
and intellectual integration, 113;
and life of church, 112—13; and
world, 111-12. Function of u., 111.
Intellectual life and u., 111. Secu-
lar u., 110—11

Unknown to be known, 190—91, 200,

Unrestricted, being as, 191, 203. U.
imperatives, 230. U. intention of
being, 191, 203. U. questioning,
191. U. range of intellect, 175—76.
U. understanding, 177. U. view-
point, 198

Unum per se, 103
Upward dynamism of universe, see

Usuard, 69
Ut in maiore I minore parte, 22 n. 16,

Utrum sit, quid sit, 122

Value, good as, 108—109. Judgments
of v., 109

Van Riet, G., 172, 173 n. 33

Vanier, P., 121 n. 24
Variables, spatial, 107 n. 23
Variation, chance, 22 n. 16, 38
Vasquez, 76
Vatican I, 20 n. 11, 73 n. 17, 74-75,

114-15, 116, 117, 126, 128, 131,
132. See also Second Vatican

Verification and act, 140. V. in data
of sense and of consciousness, 166
n. 14. V. and hypothesis, 133—34,
139. V. and knowledge of contin-
gent existence, 137

Vertical finality, see Finality
Verum, formal object of intellect, 166

n. 14. See also Judgment, Truth
Vetera novis auger e etperficere, 141
Via affirmationis, negationis, eminentiae,

Vico, 241
Videre Deum per essentiam, 83. See also

Beatific vision
Viewpoint, eternal, 38. Higher v.,

198. Total v., 204. Transcendental
v., 203. Unrestricted v., 198

Virginity, 41 n. 66, 49, 51
Virtually unconditioned, 149, 213,

Virtues, see Theological
Virtus divina creata, 61
Vision, beatific, see Beatific. V. of

concept of being (Gilson), 195, 200,

Vollzug und Begriff, dialectic of, 204
Voluntas mota et non movens, 63

We, 219
What is it? 135, 211, 212
Whatness, 212
Whole and parts, in metaphysics,

197-98; in structures, 205-206.
Ultimate and basic w., 198

Why is it so? 135, 211

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Widowhood, 49, 51
Will and common meaning, 226.

Freedom of w. (exercise, specifica-
tion), 90. W. as passive, 63-64.
See also Appetite

William of Auxerre, 115
Willing end, 57-58, 64. W. (using)

means, 55, 59, 62, 63-64
Wisdom, divine (world order), 85,

87-88, 134. Finite, human w., 87,
198; and intellectualism, 86; and
prudence, 239-40; and theologian,
125—26; and understanding, sci-
ence, 125-26

Wolff, C., 188-89
Woman as helpmate, 41 n. 66
Wonder, 168, 178, 186, 211. Twofold

w. in Christ, 178
Word (of God) incarnate, 22, 27. See

also Christ

World, authenticity of one's, 227—31.
W. constituted by meaning, 225—26,
231, 232, 233-35. W. of immedi-
acy, 224-25, 226, 231, 232, 234.
Manmade w., 233—34. W. mediated
by meaning, 225, 226, 231, 232-33;
see also Experience, Infant, Lan-
guage, Real. Modern w., 108. W. of
naive realist, idealist, critical realist,
218. One's private w. and real w.,
148, 224, 226. W. order (and finite
natures), 84-91; an intelligible
unity, 85; without grace, 88—91.
Subject and w. correlative, 226,
227-31. See also Necessity, Ordo,
Understanding, Wisdom

Wyser, P., 96 n. 8

Yes, 152

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan


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